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The Albanian - Chinese relations in the years of the Cold 
War were thrilling as much as dramatic. The age of their 
flourish in the '60-ies, unfortunately did not last for long. The 
Albanian sponsorship that China be admitted in the UN with 
full rights was a test that Enver Hoxha should exploit for the 
good of the Albanian people. It was a historic and unrepeated 
opportunity for little Albania to escape the political and 
economic impasse since the breakup of relations with the 
Soviet Union in 1961. The incompetence of the Albanian 
leadership to understand the trends of the age would mark the 
following political failure of Albania and would influent in the 
total isolation of the country. It's not difficult to understand 
that Albania had historic opportunities to join the Western side 
but chose to align with the Eastern bloc. The beginnings are 
with sensational approach with Tito's Yugoslavia. After that 
the Albanian political leadership kept Albania under the 
umbrella of the Soviet Union and at the end with China. After 
the end of the relations with China in 1978, Albania paved the 
way of the total isolation.  The secret visit of the President 
Nixon's national security adviser Dr. Kissinger to China in July 
1971 was interpreted by the Albanian communist leader as a 
betrayal of the Marxist ideology. Enver Hoxha responded with 
a harsh and rude letter on August 6th 1971 urging China to not 
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accept the visit of President Nixon the following year. This was the first 
major break in the relations between the two countries. Since then, the help 
from China for the weak Albanian economy would decline till the 
unavoidable break of July 1978. The methodology used in this paper is 
strictly comparative history analyzing the way diplomacy and politics 
should work to achieve the set aim.    
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The secret visit of Henry Kissinger to China on July 9th 19711 was a 
major success in the American foreign policy. Kissinger spent two days in 
China until July 11th discussing with the Chinese premier Chou En Lai the 
country's future in the world. When President Nixon made the famous 
announcement on July 15th 19712, four days after the secret visit, the shock 
in all the world and particularly in Tirana was with apocalyptic 
dimensions. How would the Albanian official policy react towards this 
great "betrayal" of Marxism-Leninism? The Albanian ambassador in Beijing 
was called in audience on July 17th 1971 by the Chinese premier Chou En 
Lai to be informed about the Kissinger's visit3. The Chinese premier made a 
short expose' of all the chronology events that brought to the secret visit of 
Kissinger, but said no word about why this was kept secret from Albania. 
Chou said to the ambassador that the aim of Kissinger's visit was to open 
the way for the visit of President Nixon in China4. The Chinese premier 
was careful to give to the Albanian ambassador the best essence of the visit 
according to the Chinese interest.  
For Taiwan, the Chinese stand was clear5. China would never accept the 
normalization of relations with USA until its full recognition as the only 
legitimate government. Taiwan was simply a part of China and the external 
intrusions would never be allowed6. The problem of "two Chinas" or "one 
                                                 
1 Kissinger H., (1979), “White House Years”. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson. p. 739. 
2 Ibid.  p. 760. 
3 Albanian Central National Archive (1971), F. 14./AP-MPKK, File No. 3, p. 1. 
4 Ibid. p. 12. 
5 Ibid. p. 14. 
6 Ibid. p. 15. 
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China and one Taiwan" was totally unacceptable for the Chinese 
government7. Kissinger had not directly accepted that Taiwan was part of 
China but has not denied it either8. China would be accepted in the UN, 
but not on American conditions (not firing Taiwan from UN)9. Chou En Lai 
asked the Albanian ambassador to thank on his behalf the Albanian 
authorities for the elaborated project to make China part of the United 
Nations10. But what was the Albanian project?  
  
2. Albania and China; the impossible alliance 
 
The Albanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nesti Nase had informed 
Chou En Lai on June 15th 1971 about the steps Albania would undertake to 
make possible the recognition of China in the UN. Albania has prepared a 
resolution and the Albanian mission in New York was instructed to contact 
the representatives of Algeria, Cuba and Zambia for this issue in order to 
be prepared for the definitive instructions11. On July 23rd 1971, the Albanian 
diplomat in New York, Sokrat Plaka, came to Tirana to coordinate the 
strategy that would be used by Albania in the General Assembly of the 
United Nations. The ambassador had the idea that "the Chinese part should be 
informed over the presentation of the request in the UN secretariat for the 
establishment of the China's rights in the day order of the General Assembly. After 
putting in evidence the role of our country [Albania] as the promoter of this issue, 
the Albanian ambassador informed the Chinese counselor of the Chinese embassy 
in Tirana, Siap Siu Fen, over the preparatory work done with the advisers and gave 
him two copies (in French and English) of the documents handled in the secretariat 
of the UN. On the first meeting the Chinese counselor was informed for three 
issues: (a) the discussion within the July 21st 1971 the right of China to join the 
UN in the order of the day, (b) the handling of every document (letters, 
explanatory memories and resolutions) and (c) the appointment of Albania's and 
Algeria delegations to prepare the documents. On the second meeting, was 
approved to make some changes in the secretariat on July 15th to change the text of 
                                                 
7 Ibid. p. 15. 
8 Ibid. p. 16. 
9 Ibid. p. 17. 
10 Ibid., p. 17. 
11 Albanian Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1971), File No. 150, p. 16. 
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resolution and to add the number of co-authors from 15 to 17 and the Pakistan 
which was added as co-author"12.  
It was unavoidable the fact that China would be accepted with full 
rights in the UN, but before this extraordinary step could be achieved, 
Albania or better say, its undisputed leader Enver Hoxha would make the 
next mistake. His senseless megalomania for the rest of world was 
something usual, but this time the Albanian leader overreacted. He should 
have been tenfold more careful because on the relations with China 
depended the Albanian economic survival. Enver Hoxha sent e long letter 
of 19 pages to Mao Tse Tung on August 6th 1971 saying that… 
 
"…we make known to you that we don’t approve your decision to welcome 
Nixon in Beijing"13. 
 
The long letter by the Albanian leader was full of political demagogy, 
senseless and a big step back in the relations with China. The Albanian 
dictator had a big chance to play an important role in fastening the ties 
between China and USA. But his senseless demagogy and rude Stalinism 
obstructed him to think straight and to catch this golden opportunity to use 
his country as bridge for China and America. But he was against every 
diplomatic consensus with the US. This big mistake was to cause Albania a 
hard self-isolation in the years to come till the collapse of communism.  
The visit of Henry Kissinger "erased" Albania from the map of China's 
interests. Enver Hoxha was aware of it even by the fact that no reply came 
from China to his letter. But to soften the relations with China, Albanian 
Resolution of October 25th 1971 won and China was accepted with full 
rights in the UN. According to this historic day the New York Times wrote: 
 
"The Tanzanians, who were among the floor managers for Peking, jumped from 
their seats in the front row and did a little victory dance. The Algerians, fellow 
cosponsors, embraced one another. The Albanians sedately shook hands. Others 
stood up, applauded, cheered. Rhythmic clapping beat against the walls. The 
vote on the Albanian resolution 90 minutes later was anticlimactic. The result 
was 76-35, with 17 abstentions (and without a single NATO ally on the 
American side)"14.  
                                                 
12 Ibid. p. 25-26. 
13 Ibid. p. 51. 
14 Kissinger H., (1979), “White House Years”. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson. p. 784. 
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3. The first tension in the Sino-Albanian relations 
 
Albania gave a big contribution for the acceptance of China in the UN, 
having in mind the size and shape of the Balkan country. The approval of 
the Albanian resolution was the peak of the Albanian-Chinese relations in 
the beginning of the '70-ies. Not very often the small countries in 
international relations take big proportions. But the Enver Hoxha letter of 
August 6th had ruined everything. Aware of what has done, the Albanian 
communist leader tried to fix it but it was too late. He sent a second letter 
on September 1st 1971 which was an invitation for a Chinese delegation 
from the Central Committee to participate in the VI Congress of the Labour 
Party of Albania15. The response from China came after a month and a half 
on October 14th 1971, and was handled to Ramiz Alia with the regret that 
by decision of the IX Congress of Chinese Communist Party no delegations 
will be sent to other Communist party sisters16. This official response was 
like a "bomb" for the Albanian leadership. At the same moment Ramiz Alia 
after receiving these news, tried to get an explanation from the Chinese 
Ambassador in Tirana. The talking was not so much cordial and the official 
of the Albanian Central Committee told the ambassador: 
 
"According to your communication I will transmit it to the Party Central 
Committee. But I want to express my opinion what you communicated to me. 
Of course, the decision to not send a delegation is a matter of your Party. But 
the arguments that you stated do not stand, they convince nobody. You say that 
among new Marxism-Leninism parties exists different views, or in one country 
exist two or three of them. But the Communist Party of China has not been 
invited in an international meeting. She has been invited in the Congress of the 
Labour Party of Albania. So, what is the point for the other Marxist-Leninist 
parties of other countries? According to what you said, that the Chinese 
comrades are busy and cannot travel abroad, I can't say anything, because it is 
an internal matter of your Party. But I will transmit to the Central Committee 
your communication"17.  
 
Indeed the break had happened and this is proved even by the official 
declaration of ATSH (Albanian Telegraphic Agency) of October 26th 1971 
                                                 
15 Albanian Central National Archive (1971), F. 14./AP-MPKK, File no. 10, p. 1. 
16 Ibid, File no. 9, p. 1. 
17 Ibid. p. 1. 
Dr.sc. Gjon BORIÇI 
_____________________________ 
ILIRIA International Review – Vol 6, No 1 (2016) 
© Felix–Verlag, Holzkirchen, Germany and Iliria College, Pristina, Kosovo 
112 
where was read a simple statement wishing all the best to China for being 
accepted in UN18. From China came tepid radiograms about what was said 
about the Albanian resolution in the highest circles of Chinese politics19. 
The VI Congress of the Party of Labor of Albania was held on November 
1971 where was spoken a lot about the country's successes and nothing 
about the absence of the Chinese delegation. Enver Hoxha was careful 
because wouldn't like to further aggravate the relations with China. In his 
secret diary he "strikes" hardly on China for the change of course from 
Marxism towards United States of America. The success of Albania for the 
acceptance of China in UN he has described as "a victory of a small but 
invincible country against the most powerful imperialist one"20.  
  
4.  The break off of Sino-Albanian relations 
 
The news that China wouldn't send a delegation to the Albanian 
Communist Party congress was widely spread. On November 10th 1971, 
from Warsaw came the radiogram that the politics there was thinking that 
the real cause of not sending a delegation to the congress was because the 
Nixon visit in Beijing21. In fact, the real reason was the offensive letter of 
Enver Hoxha and this was the first major break in the relations between 
two countries. The year 1972 would further testify the aggravation of 
relations between China and Albania. The visit of President Nixon in 
February 1972, influenced a lot in the change of Albania's politics towards 
China. The Albanian politics and personally Enver Hoxha, showed 
themselves very weak and not at all pragmatic to understand the great 
changes in the international diplomacy. Economically, Albania continued 
to be very dependent from China. The break of relations with the Soviet 
Union in 1961 had related the small Balkan country with the country of 
Mao Tse Tung. In his diary on China, Enver Hoxha was "careful" not to 
speak rudely for the country on which depended the economic survival of 
Albania. But, according to Hoxha, China was fighting to take the hegemony 
from the hands of the Soviet Union22. After the Sino-American joint 
statement, Hoxha wouldn't hesitate to write: 
                                                 
18 Ibid. p. 82. 
19 Ibid., p. 94. 
20 Hoxha, Enver (1979), "Shёnime pёr Kinёn", Vol. I. Tirana: 8 Nёntori. p. 582. 
21 Albanian Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1971), File No. 152, p. 123. 
22 Hoxha, Enver (1979), "Shёnime pёr Kinёn", Vol. I. Tirana: 8 Nёntori. p. 646. 
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"The Chinese have deflected as Khrushchev"23.  
 
Beyond any doubt, the visit of President Nixon in China was like a 
hammer hit on the head of Enver Hoxha. His shock was enormous, but he 
couldn't verbally attack China as he has done with Yugoslavia and Soviet 
Union. This for a simple reason. Nobody would care about his power and 
country if he broke up with China. Now all the socialist countries were 
revisionist, and the only Marxist country in doctrine has remained Albania. 
The country now was standing alone and the "betrayal" of China was 
difficult to swallow for Enver Hoxha. The dices have fallen and was 
expected who would made the first step to definitively break the relations.  
The year 1972 was tepid in the relations among the two countries. Of 
course there was exchange of delegations as for example the visit of deputy 
defense minister Qiao Kuan Hua who refused to give any kind of interview 
to the press24. Indeed, his visit was to gather information if any change 
existed in the Albanian policy towards China and what impact had in the 
country the fall of Lin Biao25.  
On November 9th 1972, a delegation of the National Bank of China came 
to discuss the credits for Albanian agriculture26. This time, the Chinese 
delegation was not inclined to fulfill the Albanian requests. This was 
proved in the diary of Enver Hoxha when he writes that "The Chinese are not 
willing to fulfill our economic requests"27.   
After the acceptance of China in the UN, Enver Hoxha began to think 
that the far Asian country would have been a temporary ally of his country. 
Albania would enter a phase where with many difficulties would survive 
even without China. The mistakes of Albanian politics would inflict the 
country a severe damage in the economy and daily life. Beyond its 
strengths, Albania entered a phase to fortify the country to be protected 
from the foreign "attacks". Indeed, this was a simple move to cover the 
internal failures and to find "hostile groups". Instead of taking advantage 
from international détente, Enver Hoxha and his clique plunged the 
country in a higher tension of class struggle.  
                                                 
23 Ibid. p. 651. 
24 Ibid. p. 722. 
25 Ibid. p. 723. 
26 Albanian Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1972), File No. 136, p. 9. 
27 Hoxha, Enver (1979), "Shёnime pёr Kinёn", Vol. I. Tirana: 8 Nёntori. p. 731. 
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The Sino-Albanian relations had helped in a sort of liberalization within 
some fields in Albania. At the end of the '60-ies and the beginning of the 
'70-ies the arts, the music, the theatre and cinema were taking high-toned 
dimensions. But this was very short. In 1973, began the first strikes on art 
with the Plenum of June 1973 when for the first time Enver Hoxha claimed 
that the ideological aggression precedes the military and economic one28. In 
1974 was to come an earthquake on the Albanian military. Beqir Balluku, 
Minister of Defense was to be called a putschist and traitor and was 
executed that same year29.  
Since the beginning of 1974 (25.01.1974), the Prime Minister Mehmet 
Shehu had sent to Enver Hoxha a detailed information about the Sino-
Albanian relations30. It is very clearly written that China and USA would 
tie very closely together in economic terms and America would supply 
China with modern satellites to observe the Red Army moves on the 
frontier31. In this information is to stress the courage of Mehmet Shehu who 
offers advice to the supreme leader to urge the détente between Sino-Soviet 
relations but China should not yield if the Soviet Union does not accept all 
the wrongs on China32.  
Meanwhile, the economic situation was worsening. On January 17th 
1974, the Minister of Commerce, Kiço Ngjela informed Enver Hoxha that 
the prices of trade with China for 1974 would raise and Albania would find 
itself in big difficulties. The re-exportation would raise from 2.3 billion 
rubles to 3.4 billion33. Kiço Ngjela was reasoning that with the raise of 
prices, Albania was very weak to afford it and suggested to accept the 
proposal of the Chinese part that the difference of prices should be covered 
only with the raise of oil price and this only for the 1974. For the years to 
come the Chinese wouldn't accept this kind of payment34.  
The year 1975 was very important for the European and world politics. 
In July 1975 was signed the Helsinki Charter by every European country 
except Albania. More and more the country was sinking into an 
unprecedented self-isolation. The relations with China were reaching the 
                                                 
28 Historia e popullit shqiptar (2009), Vol. IV. Tirana: Toena. p. 297. 
29 Ibid. p. 299. 
30 Albanian Central National Archive (1974), F. 14./AP-MPKK, File No. 2, p. 1. 
31 Ibid. p. 1. 
32 Ibid. p. 1. 
33 Ibid. p. 5. 
34 Ibid. p. 5. 
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lowest point ever. In the international relations, Albania continued to 
support China. By Albanian request, China was welcomed as a member of 
World Olympic Organization35. This movement was highly acclaimed by 
Albania but didn't help to improve the relations with China. A stronger 
move was required. In January 1975, from the Albanian embassy in Paris 
came the news that in the diplomatic circles of the country [France], was 
whispered for a possible visit of Enver Hoxha in China36. Even in Beijing 
during a diplomatic dinner, the Soviet ambassador had asked the Chinese 
guest if it was true that Enver Hoxha was coming to China. According to 
the radiograms sent by the Albanian ambassador Behar Shtylla, the 
Chinese diplomat answered that for this issue is to be asked Enver Hoxha 
himself37. Even from Belgrade came news about the visit of a higher 
Albanian delegation to China, chaired by Enver Hoxha38.   
From all the Albanian diplomats around the world the news about a 
possible visit of Enver Hoxha to China, was categorically denied. In his 
diary on China, the Albanian leader does not confirms such a thing. But 
Albania needed fresh economic aids from China. After long conversations 
by the Albanian ambassador, it was agreed that a high delegation from 
Albania, chaired by deputy prime-minister Adil Çarçani was to be 
welcomed in China on June 14th 1975.  The aim was to make e fresh request 
for e new credit for the sixth quinquennial 1976-198039. 
Enver Hoxha sentenced this meeting in his diary as very tense and as 
the beginning of economic pressure from the side of China40. Adil Çarçani 
was sending daily detailed reports to the supreme leader about his visit. 
The information was very discouraging. China has agreed giving Albania a 
new loan of 500 million Yuen (225 million rubles) instead of 823 million 
rubles required by Albania41. In his report, Adil Çarçani said that the 
Chinese counterpart showed a very negative attitude and the allocation of 
such a small loan according to him, was not logical and without argument 
because previously the Chinese had declared that the power of China has 
                                                 
35 Albanian Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1975), File No 129, p. 14 
36 Ibid. File No. 131, p. 1. 
37 Ibid. p. 3-4. 
38 Ibid. p. 5. 
39 Albanian Central National Archive (1975), F. 14./AP-MPKK, File No. 6, p. 2. 
40 Hoxha, Enver (1979), "Shёnime pёr Kinёn", Vol. I. Tirana: 8 Nёntori. p. 107. 
41 Albanian Central National Archive (1975), F. 14./AP-MPKK, File No. 6, p. 3. 
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arisen and the aid toward Albania was to be increased42. The Albanian 
delegation asked for the building of 20 new works but the Chinese have 
agreed only for 1043. 
During the negotiations, the Chinese part raised some problems about 
the unpaid loans and the problems of stock transport from China to 
Albania44. The true drama was to happen in the meeting of June 24th 1875 
between Li Hsien Nien and Adil Çarçani. The Albanian official tried to 
relocate the conversation into the Marxist dogma of mutual help. But the 
requests for China were unacceptable. Li Hsien Nien reminded Adil 
Çarçani that to comply the requests of Albania, China had to buy cereals 
from Canada and Australia, meanwhile Albania was situated just in front 
of Italy45. Adil Çarçani was embarrassed and told to his Chinese 
counterpart that "the problem of loans postponement was seen as a 
temporary solution not as a way out"46. 
In a last attempt Adil Çarçani tried to gain more from China and asked 
Li Hsien Nien:  
 
"Adil Çarçani: Once again to clarify our concrete proposals that the new loan 
from China for the sixth quinquennial 1976-1980 would be less than 1 billion 
and 200 million Yuen and if this is impossible at lest we require 1 billion Yuen 
now, and the other 200 million in a further negotiation. Should we consider this 
definitive or should we wait another answer from comrade Mao Tse Tung?  
Li Hsien Nien: There is not going to be another answer. Our response as we 
said in our last meeting and in this one, is definitive"47. 
 
On July 11th 1975 after the return from China, Adil Çarçani gave the 
following proposal: 
 
"In order to face the current situation we should call a general mobilization to 
exploit all our opportunities and reserves from our people's economy, relying 
only on our own forces"48.  
                                                 
42 Ibid. p. 4. 
43 Ibid. p. 4. 
44 Ibid. p. 6. 
45 Ibid. p. 62. 
46 Ibid. p. 66. 
47 Ibid. p. 70. 
48 Ibid.  p. 70  
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This would have been the devise of the Albanian politics till the fall of 
Berlin Wall: we build socialism with our own forces! The collapse of 
Albanian economy was unavoidable. The agreement signed in Beijing on 
July 3rd 1975 would force Albania to pay the loan in ten years starting from 
January 1st 1991 till December 31st 200049.  
In December 1977, the Chinese declined to send their specialists in the 
works built with Chinese technology with the pretext that the conditions of 
their function were lacking50. The other blow came as "gift" for the New 
Year, on December 28th 1977 when the Deputy Director the Soviet Union 
and Eastern European countries Shiang Tu, informed the Albanian 
diplomat in China Musin Kroi that the "New Albania" magazine wouldn't 
be published anymore in China51. The reason of this interruption was 
because the Albanian leadership had begun a defamatory propaganda 
against the leadership of the People's Republic of China and this was 
unacceptable52. The Albanian diplomat denied any allegation and 
responded that it was a Chinese internal affair if they wanted to publish the 
magazine or not53. 
But the real "torpedo" came from the Chinese note of July 7th 1978, 
containing eight pages. It notified about the total interruption of any help, 
economic and military, and the recall of every Chinese specialist working 
in Albania54. Another justification for this attitude was the refusal of 
Albania to pay 25 bills of 10 million Yuen each, for the works built between 
December 1977 and April 197855.  
To the Chinese attitude, the Albanian leadership responded after three 
weeks with a 29 pages long letter which was sent to Beijing on July 30th 
197856. In the letter was stressed that China had acted with the position of a 
big power against a small country with the savage methods of Tito, 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev which, some time ago China herself has 
condemned57.  
 
                                                 
49 Ibid. p. 76. 
50 Historia e popullit shqiptar (2009), Vol. IV. Tirana: Toena.  p. 305. 
51 Albanian Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1977), File No. 245, p. 7. 
52 Ibid. p. 7. 
53 Ibid. p. 7. 
54 Albanian Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1978), File No. 283, p. 2. 
55 Ibid. p. 35. 
56 Ibid. p. 73. 
57 Ibid. p. 74. 
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In this process, Albania was interested simply in the ideological 
relations, not the essence of them. In China, after the detachment from the 
Soviet orbit and its acceptance in the UN, the interest dimension preceded 
the ideological one. 
For the specifics of the communist regime that both countries applied, 
the ideological relations were institutionalized through the cooperation 
between the communist parties of both countries. China and Albania were 
geo-strategically very much opposed. China and the Chinese people were 
great contributors for the Asian culture, meanwhile Albania and Albanians 
were contributors in the Balkan region. Also, the weight of both countries 
was very different. Albania with only 28748 km2 and nearly 2 million and a 
half of population, in the '70-ies was turned into a pettifogging country 
since it left the Warsaw Treaty in 1968. Albania and Albanians could have 
been an important factor in the Balkans, but nowhere else.  
China was a world power even though not a member of the UN until 
1971. With a surface of nine million and a half km2 and nearly 800 million 
inhabitants and with sixteen countries around her borders, was impossible 
to relate itself to one single country. These are the reasons to analyze the 
Sino-Albanian relations and why they failed. Albania couldn't compare 
with China and China couldn't stand with Albania in its road, in 
conquering the right place in the world politics.          
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